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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Bowersox Truck Sales & Service, Inc. ("BTS") appeals the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Harco National Insurance Company on BTS's claim for 
breach of contract and bad faith arising under an 
insurance policy Harco had issued to BTS. For the reasons 
that follow, we will reverse, and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. 
 
Harco issued a policy of commercial property insurance 
to BTS by which Harco insured business property of BTS. 
The insurance included coverage for interruption of BTS's 
business resulting from damage to the insured property. 
The policy included business interruption insurance. The 
policy stated, "No one may bring a legal action .. . under 
this Coverage Part unless: . . . [t]he action is brought within 
2 years after the date on which the direct physical loss or 
damage occurred." App. at 19a. 
 
On March 4-5, 1994, the weight of accumulated ice and 
snow on the roof of the insured building caused that 
building to partially collapse. BTS attempted to shore up 
the property, and then submitted an insurance claim to 
Harco. In response, on October 25, 1994, Harco issued four 
checks totaling $169,610.66. App. at 205a-206a. That sum 
included an advance in the amount of $19,500 under the 
Business Interruption and Extra Expense portion of the 
policy. Harco purportedly advanced that sum in the belief 
that the building could be repaired. Harco calculated the 
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amount of BTS's loss under the Business Interruption 
coverage based upon Harco's assumption that BTS would 
lose $4,000/week for three weeks, and would also have to 
rent another building during those three weeks at a cost of 
$2,500/week. However, BTS and Harco failed to agree on 
whether the building could be repaired, or the cost of repair 
if repair was possible. BTS eventually concluded that the 
building had to be replaced, and it sued Harco in 1994 to 
recover replacement costs of the building. In that suit, BTS 
also sought a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to 
recover the actual loss of the business income suffered 
while the building was being replaced. 
 
On August 31, 1995, Harco and BTS formally agreed to 
settle BTS's claim for the replacement cost of the building. 
In return for payment of $250,000 from Harco, BTS and 
Harco entered into a settlement agreement that was 
affirmed by the district court. That agreement provided in 
pertinent part as follows: 
 
       FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the payment to 
       [Bowersox] of the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY- 
       NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-NINE 
       DOLLARS and THIRTY-FOUR CENTS ($129,369.34), 
       . . . we . . . release . . . Harco National Insurance 
       Company . . . of and from any and all past, present 
       and future actions. . . including claims or suits based 
       upon negligence, breach of contract, bad faith, and any 
       claims (except for business interruption as described 
       below) seeking recovery for any sums of money under 
       Commercial Property Insurance Policy No. CFR 00 10 
       95-08 . . . for all damages (except for business 
       interruption as described below) to property belonging 
       to and owned by Bowersox. 
 
App. at 54a-56a. However, the settlement agreement 
specifically reserved BTS's right to pursue any claim it may 
have under the business interruption coverage as follows: 
 
       It is hereby stipulated and agreed that this Settlement 
       and Release shall apply to all claims except for 
       business interruption damages as described below, 
       resulting from the aforementioned accumulation of 
       snow and ice affecting the building, including its 
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       attached office. . . . The present payment . . . in 
       addition to two payments already made by Harco to 
       Bowersox . . . is intended to finally settle any and all 
       claims Bowersox may have against Harco except as 
       related to business interruption as described as 
       follows. Nothing in this Release shall prevent Bowersox 
       from submitting a claim to Harco and otherwise 
       pursuing that claim for business interruption and extra 
       expense under [the policy] pursuant to the language of 
       the "Business Income Coverage Form (and Extra 
       Expense)" as provided in that policy. The parties 
       expressly recognize that Harco continues to insure 
       Bowersox and this Release is not intended to effect[sic] 
       Bowersox's right to make claim under its current or 
       any future policy with Harco for future loss or damage 
       covered by such policies. . . . 
 
App. at 56a (emphasis added). The agreement also 
contained the following language regarding BTS's right to 
subsequently bring a claim against Harco for the latter's 
bad faith: 
 
       [W]e the Releasors do further release Harco from any 
       and all claims that we may have for the manner in 
       which all claims under the aforementioned policy have 
       been handled, adjusted, negotiated or settled, 
       including, but not limited to, claims based on . . . 
       Pennsylvania Bad Faith Insurance Law, or any other 
       law applicable to insurance practices. . . . We 
       additionally release Harco for any claims we have 
       under any theory of bad faith or unfair claims handling 
       practices. 
 
Id. App. 56a-57a (emphasis added). 
 
On or about September 27, 1995, counsel for BTS sent a 
letter to Harco outlining a proposal to adjust the business 
interruption and extra expense portion of BTS's claims. In 
that letter, BTS explained why it was not possible to repair 
the existing structure, and also outlined its intent to 
construct a new, smaller facility to temporarily house its 
business while the damaged building was being replaced. 
The letter specifically informed Harco that "The contractor 
who will be doing the work would like to begin erecting the 
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Addition this fall in order to be able to start replacement of 
the existing building in the early spring. Accordingly, we 
would like to resolve this issue as soon as possible." App at 
222a. Therefore, Harco clearly knew that it was highly 
improbable that BTS would not be able to complete 
replacement of the damaged building before March 5, 1996, 
the second anniversary of the partial collapse. 
 
Even though the Commercial Property Conditions portion 
of the policy contained the aforementioned requirement that 
the insured bring any legal action within two years of the 
"direct physical loss or damage," the Business Income 
Coverage Form (And Extra Expenses) coverage part of the 
policy stated: 
 
       We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you 
       sustain due to the necessary suspension of your 
       "operations" during the "period of restoration." The 
       suspension must be caused by direct physical loss of, 
       or damage to property at the premises described in the 
       Declarations, . . . resulting from any Covered Cause of 
       Loss. 
 
App. at 40a. The policy also states under S 3 of the 
Business Income Coverage Form: "We will pay any Extra 
Expense to minimize the suspension of business if you 
cannot continue `operations' . . . to the extent that it [the 
Extra Expense] reduces the amount of loss that otherwise 
would have been payable under this Coverage Form." 
Section 3 of the policy defines the covered "extra expense" 
as follows: 
 
       Extra expense means necessary expenses you incur 
       during the "period of restoration" that you would not 
       have incurred if there had been no direct physical loss 
       or damage to property caused by or resulting from a 
       Covered Cause of Loss. 
 
App. at 40a. Under the policy, Harco also undertakes to 
pay: 
 
       (1) . . . any Extra Expense to avoid or minimize the 
       suspension of business and to continue "operations": 
 
       (a) At the described premises; or 
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       (b) At replacement premises or at temporary 
       locations, including: 
 
         (i) Relocation expenses; and 
 
         (ii) Costs to equip and operate the replacement 
       or temporary locations. 
 
Id. The "Period of Restoration" as used in S 3 of the 
"Business Income Coverage Form (And Extra Expense)" is 
defined as: 
 
       the period of time that: 
 
       a. Begins with the date of direct physical loss or 
       damage caused by or resulting from any Covered 
       Cause of Loss at the described premises; and 
 
       b. Ends on the date when the property at the described 
       premises should be repaired, rebuilt, or replaced with 
       reasonable speed and similar quality. 
 
App. at 46a. 
 
II. 
 
From October 18, 1995, until the present litigation was 
filed, Harco and BTS exchanged numerous letters in an 
attempt to settle the business interruption claim. In a letter 
dated October 18, 1995, Harco told BTS, "once the 
reconstruction on the building is completed," Harco would 
require certain financial documents before settling the 
claim. App. at 224a-25a (emphasis added). Harco did not 
suggest in that letter, or in any of its other numerous and 
regular communications with BTS, that Harco believed that 
the aforementioned two year limitation period began to run 
on March 5 when the building collapsed. As noted above, 
BTS's September 27 letter to Harco informed Harco that 
BTS would not be able to begin construction on a 
replacement building until the spring of 1996. Thus, Harco 
was clearly alerted (by that letter as well as by numerous 
other communications) to the possibility that BTS may not 
be able to present its claim for business interruption 
insurance until more than two years after the date of the 
partial collapse. Nevertheless, in several of its 
communications to BTS, Harco stated that it (Harco) would 
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address the business interruption claim upon the 
termination of the reconstruction period. Indeed, in a letter 
dated January 2, 1996, discussing possible settlement, 
Harco advised BTS that "we can settle the business income 
and extra expense claim after the loss is actually incurred 
and upon our receipt of satisfactory documentation .. ." 
See, generally, App. at 205a-206a, 229a-41a. 
 
BTS did not complete reconstruction of the building until 
on or about January 1, 1997. App. at 157a. On January 
14, 1997, BTS's lawyer sent Harco's lawyer a letter and 
several documents that Harco had requested BTS to send 
upon completion of the reconstruction of the property. App. 
at 232a. On February 27, 1997, BTS submitted an 
evaluation of the business interruption loss, as per Harco's 
request. Harco did not then assert the two year limitation 
under the policy as it now does. Rather, on March 7, 1997, 
Harco requested additional information that it purportedly 
needed to process BTS's claim. App. at 264a. This pattern 
continued and Harco's investigation of BTS's claim 
remained open until December 10, 1997, when BTSfinally 
filed the instant suit against Harco. The district court 
granted Harco's motion for summary judgment and 
dismissed BTS's claims and, after the district court denied 
reconsideration, BTS filed the instant appeal. 
 
III. 
 
Our review of the grant of summary judgment is plenary. 
W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493 (3d Cir. 1995). "Summary 
judgment is appropriate when there are no issues of 
material fact . . . and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as matter of law." Id. The interpretation of an 
insurance contract is a question of law that is properly 
decided by the court, Reliance Insurance Co. v. Moessner, 
121 F.3d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1997), unless the court 
determines that the contract is ambiguous, in which case 
the interpretation of the ambiguous term is a question of 
fact. Sanford Investment Co. v. Ahlstrom Machinery 
Holdings, Inc., 198 F.3d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 1999); Hullett v. 
Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 38 F.3d 107, 111 (3d 
Cir. 1994). Here, we are concerned with the operation and 
application of the limitations provision to the damage BTS 
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incurred. Accordingly, our review is plenary. See Vanguard 
Telecommunications v. So. New England Tel., 900 F.2d 645, 
650 (3d Cir. 1990) ("The questions involved in this case are 
concerned `with the legal operation of the agreement,' 
because we . . . are not called upon to fill a gap in the 
agreement, but only to determine the legal effect of the 
agreement."). 
 
IV. 
 
A. 
 
BTS argues that the district court erred in holding"that 
BTS's business interruption claim was barred by the policy 
provision requiring suit to be commenced within two years 
of the direct physical loss or damage." Appellant's Br. at 14. 
BTS claims that, "[i]n the context of a business interruption 
claim, the `damage' is the business interruption loss, and 
the limitation period begins to run from the date of the 
business interruption." Appellant's Br. at 14. 1 The district 
court found that "the date of the direct damage is the 
starting point, and costs could have been estimated at that 
time." Op. at 5. Harco insists that the limitation under the 
policy requires that the action be filed within two years of 
March 5, 1994, because that was the date of the"direct 
physical loss or damage,"2 under the policy. See App. at 
19a. 
 
As noted above, the Business Income provisions of the 
policy provide for the payment of "necessary expenses" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Additionally, BTS argues that even if the time to file did expire, 
"Harco 
waived, extended, suspended, or is otherwise estopped from relying on 
this provision." Appellant's Br. at 15. However, we need not reach the 
issue of whether Harco waived its right to assert its time limitations 
defense. 
 
2. Harco also claims that BTS violated the policy's requirement that "No 
one may bring a legal action against [Harco] under this Coverage Part 
unless: There has been full compliance with all of the terms of this 
Coverage Part." App. at 19a. Harco alleged that BTS failed to submit to 
an examination under oath which it was obligated to do under the 
policy. See Appellee's Br. at 14. However, that was not the basis of the 
district court's ruling and that issue is not before us. 
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 incurred during the " `period of restoration' that [BTS] 
would not have incurred if there had been no direct 
physical loss or damage to property caused by or resulting 
from a Covered Cause of Loss." App. 40a. The policy further 
provides that Harco will "pay any Extra Expense to avoid or 
minimize the suspension of business and to continue 
`operations.' " App. at 40a. Moreover, the"period of 
restoration" is defined in section G of the Business Income 
Coverage Form as beginning when the initial property loss 
is suffered and it "[e]nds on the date when the property at 
the described premises should be repaired, rebuilt, or 
replaced with reasonable speed and similar quality." App. 
at 46a.3 
 
This insurance policy clearly provides coverage for"extra 
expense" the insured incurs "during the period of 
restoration" that would not have occurred absent"physical 
. . . damage to the property." However, the "period of 
restoration" "begins with the date of direct physical . . . 
damage caused by . . . any Covered Cause," and"ends on 
the date when the property . . . should be rebuilt or 
replaced with reasonable speed and similar quality." App. 
at 46a. If Harco's assertion that any suit for business 
interruption coverage must be brought within two years of 
the date the property is damaged is correct, then such a 
claim would be impossible to bring when the necessary 
reconstruction is not completed until more than two years 
from the date the property is damaged. Such a reading 
would render Harco's coverage illusory in situations like the 
one before us now. As noted above, Harco was aware that 
the period of restoration might not end until a date that 
was more than two years from the time the covered 
property was damaged. The policy specifically provides that 
the two year limitation in the Commercial Property 
Conditions is subject to "Additional Conditions in 
Commercial Property Coverage Forms." App. at 19a. This 
appears to include the aforementioned definitions and 
conditions of coverage pertaining to business income, extra 
expense, and period of restoration, contained in the 
Business Income Coverage Form. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The policy also provides that "[t]he expiration date of this policy 
will 
 
not cut short the "period of restoration." Id. 
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Thus, the district court could not properly conclude as a 
matter of law that the period for filing suit contained in the 
Commercial Property Conditions Part does not apply to 
business income loss protections. The wording of Harco's 
policy refers to different "parts" of the policy. As noted 
above, the two year limitation is contained in S D of the 
Commercial Property Conditions "part." That limitation 
states: "No one may bring a legal action against us under 
this Coverage Part unless . . . " (emphasis added). App. at 
19a. BTS's claim for business interruption insurance arises 
under a different "part" of the policy entitled: "Business 
Income Coverage Form (And Extra Expense)", and that 
"part" of the policy does not contain a similar time bar. 
App. 40a. 
 
Our interpretation of the policy is corroborated by the 
contemporary course of dealing of the parties. That course 
of dealing clearly counsels against Harco's claim that the 
two year limitations provision applied to BTS's business 
interruption coverage. In Bensalem Township v. 
International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1303, 1309 
(3rd Cir. 1994) we noted that Pennsylvania courts have 
stated, "[c]ourts must examine the totality of the insurance 
transaction involved to ascertain the reasonable expectation 
of the insured." (citing Everett Cash Mut. Ins. Co. v. Krawitz, 
633 A.2d 215, 216 (Pa. Super. 1993)). Here, the"totality of 
the insurance transaction" includes the several requests 
that Harco made for additional documentation of BTS's 
business income coverage during and after the purported 
two year limitation period. Given Harco's conduct, BTS 
could not have reasonably expected that the two-year clock 
was ticking. We will not now interpret this contract in such 
a way as to negate the entire course of dealing between 
Harco and BTS after March 1994. That course of dealing 
reflects the parties' own interpretation of this insurance 
policy, and it is very relevant to our analysis."The 
interpretation of insurance contracts to accord with the 
reasonable expectations of the insured, regardless of the 
existence of any ambiguity in the policy, constitutes judicial 
recognition of the unique nature of contracts of insurance." 
Murray v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 143, 154 
(3rd cir. 1998) (resisting an interpretation of an insurance 
policy that would "defeat, rather than promote, the purpose 
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of the . . . insurance. . .") (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).4 
 
Thus, we hold as a matter of law that the two year period 
of limitations established under the policy does not apply to 
BTS's claim for business interruption coverage. 
 
B. 
 
The district court also held that BTS released Harco from 
any future bad faith claim involving Harco's handling of 
BTS's business interruption loss. Harco argues that"[t]he 
Release excepts all claims relating to BTS's business 
interruption claim, including any bad faith claim." BTS 
claims that "[t]he express language of the Release applies 
only to BTS's bad faith claim for Harco's past conduct, and 
does not apply to any future bad faith claim based on 
Harco's future handling of BTS's business interruption 
loss." Appellant's Br. at 16. We agree. 
 
"A signed release is binding upon the parties unless 
executed and procured by fraud, duress, accident or 
mutual mistake." Three Rivers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 
522 F.2d 885, 892 (3d Cir. 1975); see also Billman v. 
Pennsylvania Assigned Claims Plan, 503 A.2d 932, 935 (Pa. 
Super. 1986); ACF Produce, Inc. v. CHUBB/Pacific 
Indemnity Group, 451 F.Supp. 1095, 1101 (E. D. Pa. 1978). 
However, "a release covers only those matters which may 
fairly be said to have been within the contemplation of the 
parties when the release was given." Restifo v. McDonald, 
230 A.2d 199, 201 (Pa. 1967). Thus, "the general words of 
the release will not be construed so as to bar the 
enforcement of a claim which has not accrued at the date 
of release." Id. (referring to those claims contemplated by 
both parties at the time of execution). However, that is 
exactly what the district court did here. By holding that the 
general words of BTS's release applied to future claims for 
loss of business income, the court stretched the language of 
the Release beyond the words agreed upon by the parties, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In Murray, we were interpreting a contract of health insurance, but 
the analysis there is nevertheless relevant to our present inquiry given 
the parameters of this dispute. 
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and applied them to future claims that are not included in 
the language of BTS's general release. The parties agreed 
that BTS was releasing such claims for Harco's handling of 
BTS's claims that "[BTS] may have under the theory of bad 
faith . . . ." The parties did not agree that BTS was releasing 
any such claims that it may now have, or may have at any 
time in the future. "[T]he general rule for construction of 
releases is that the intention of the parties must govern, 
but this intention must be gathered from the language of 
the release." Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 
F.2d at 892. This release reflects an intention to release 
claims BTS may have had at the time the release was 
entered into, but not to release any such claims that may 
accrue in the future. Only the present tense appears in the 
relevant portions of the release. Harco's argument would 
have us reword the release and insert the future tense that 
is now absent. 
 
Releases are strictly construed "so as to avoid the ever 
present possibility that the releasor may be overreaching." 
Restifo v. McDonald, 230 A.2d at 201. Thus, even if we 
concluded that the scope of the release was ambiguous, we 
would still find, as a matter of law that this release did not 
include future claims of bad faith that accrued based upon 
the manner in which Harco handled BTS's claim for 
business interruption coverage after the release was 
executed. See Three Rivers, 522 F.2d at 887. 
 
V. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the ruling 
of the district court and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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